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Charles E. Clark*
M Y real acquaintance with Walter Wheeler Cook began in the
summer of 1919, when I went on the Yale Law faculty as its
greenest member. Cook was then finishing his work at Yale for
what proved to be only a temporary hegira to Columbia. Since he
was an inveterate office visitor, congenitally disposed to debate
everything from the latest theory of jurisprudence to the smallest
detail of school operation, and since he took an especial interest in
the younger faculty, I would undoubtedly have seen much of
him in any event. It so happened, however, that I was given a
small office which opened up into his. Hence chance thus put me
in the natural flow of the burning lava from his mind, and in con-
sequence daily and almost hourly I basked in its glow when I did
not wither in its heat. This was for me a postgraduate legal edu-
cation of inestimable value. By it, as I can now see, my legal
thinking and my approach to legal education and the judicial
process were permanently shaped. I regard Cook as, save Holmes
himself, the earliest and still in some ways the most pre-eminent
of our legal realists; and though the debate as to the definition of
a realist is likely to continue, I doubt if there will be real question
of Cook's outstanding place in the movement and hence in Amer-
ican legal thought.
It is now an easy criticism to make that the realistic philosophy
was negative in character, that it was limited to pointing out the
truism that legal thinking had been much, or too much, shaped by
undisclosed and unadmitted preconceptions, and that its trend was
towards destroying whatever certainty there was in the law. That,
however, seems to me to say little more than that the objective of
its central drive, now after the event, appears both so obvious
and so accepted that we forget the need which gave it birth. One
has only to go back to some of the former constitutional decisions,
and to observe there-and, indeed, in numerous other branches
of the law as well-how unblushingly conclusions were carefully
deduced from premises all too blithely assumed, to be convinced
that a change in the direction of greater straightforwardness was
healthy and refreshing, in truth the healthiest development of our
time in the legal field. Perhaps such a development was inevitable;
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it certainly was in accordance with modern habits and attitudes
of thought generally. -But it was the stimulus of vigorous and
inquiring minds, such as Cook's, which actually shook the hold of
conceptualistic thinking on law. And he brought to legal think-
ing not merely a constant and determined challenge to all juristic
clich6s, but, in addition, a special contribution in the scientific
approach, the application of scientific method, to law. He had
been trained in, and had taught, physics and mathematics, and
was convinced that an objective approach was as feasible and as
necessary in law as in scientific experimentation generally. And he
constantly taught by .example, so much so that his impress is large
in the law school world and on the profession itself. One cannot
foretell the future; but I venture to think that we shall not soon
again see that kind of blind deduction from debatable premises
which made our latest constitutional crisis so bitter and its direct
resolution so disturbing to conservative minds. For this we have
*the leadership of Cook and of a few other kindred minds particu-
larly to thank.
As a matter of fact, the driving force which kept him ever
restless, even as he circulated among law school offices, as well as
among different law schools, was perhaps his outstanding char-
acteristic. Often he seemed to rush headlong into difficulties which
a more compromising individual might well have smoothed over.
On an occasion or two, particularly in later years, I came in con-
tact with some of these movements of his, and faced the unfortu-
nate necessity of having to assume opposition to some, as I be-
lieved, ill advised positions he had taken. But as I look over his
career, I am not disposed to regret his lack of facility in compro-
mise; for I recall how often being conciliatory or tactful means in
essence a yielding and ultimate retreat from principle, making im-
mediately for quietude, it is true, but ultimately for forfeiture of
leadership. I prefer Walter Cook as he was--an eternal fighter
who offered even his allies only the goad and the hair shirt-than
as a tactful retreater from positions taken; and these, I fear, are
the alternatives involved. At bottom in his make-up there was
a great deal of human shyness or bashfulness. I suspect that he
was often driven to his advanced positions because shyness initially
suggested the withdrawal which his intellect would not counte-
nance. One could only see him in his very pleasant home life to
realize how human, even boyishly attractive, these qualities
could be.
Others will undoubtedly speak of Cook's pre-eminence in his
chosen field, including those seemingly so diverse as criminal law,
conflict of laws, equity, and jurisprudence. I should like, how-
ever, to emphasize his unique contribution to a field crossing all
these subjects, but, I believe, giving each of them its unique ap-
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peal to him, namely, that of pleading and procedure. Since Cook
spent all his life as a student-and a scientific student, too, who
would make the law itself a science-there were those who thought
him impractical. Actually his was the most practical of minds,
as he viewed court litigation, much more practical than lawyers
and judges whose eyes have been glued to a particular code. And
his studies in the conflict of laws, where substantive doctrine is
wrapped in the folds of differing procedures, in equity, where
the modern union of law and equity worries so many legalists by
its very simplicity, and even in common-law pleading, where, not-
withstanding many technicalities, the fundamental rules are clear
and simple-all these led to his notable emphasis on the straight-
forward approach which should be the aim of all procedure and is
the goal of modern procedural reform.
In this field many particular topics which he made peculiarly
his own by clarity and brilliance of treatment deserve special men-
tion. Among these are his clear-cut analysis of the powers of
courts of equity, including consideration of the conflict of equity
and law, the pleading of the so-called "equitable defenses" in the
modern civil action, the methods of enforcing equitable judg-
ments, the utility and need of a system like the Australian for the
enrollment and enforcement of judgments in other states of our
federal system without the necessity of separate suit, and the effect
of judgments under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitu-
tion. But there is one topic to which I wish to call particular
attention because it seems to show so typically the razor-sharp
quality of his mind, which so easily penetrated through a maze of
abstractions, ponderous and confusing, to bring out the essential
simplicity of the prosess actually involved. I refer to his two
outstanding articles, sixteen years apart, on pleading facts: State-
ments of Fact in Pleading under the Codes' and 'Facts' and iState-
ments of Fact.2 These deal with a subject certainly trite enough
in seeming; but all the maze of pseudo learning which had devel-
oped around law, facts and evidence, ultimate facts and evidential
facts, and the other abstractions, had made simple pleading a
dreadful and a fearsome task. It is not too much to say that the
modern highly successful trend to simplified pleading is built upon
Cook's demonstration that these abstractions were not absolutes,
only at most differences of degree, which should turn not on for-
malistic rules, but on the need or convenience of the business in
hand, and the amount of persuasive pressure the pleader desires
presently to apply.
There has been much in American legal realism, at least in its
outer fringes, to arouse and disturb the bar by causing the lawyers
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to wonder whether its philosophy would allow any law at all to
remain as a guide for the devout. It is refreshing, therefore, as
well as instructive, to see how the thinking of one of the great
leaders of the movement actually came out at the point of the most
simple and practical system of court procedure yet devised.
Homer F. Carey*
T HE death of Walter Wheeler Cook on November 7, 1943,
marked the passing of one of the last of a very small and dis-
tinguished group of legal scholars who had given shape and direc-
tion to legal education in this country. For many years he was
acknowledged to be an outstanding legal educator. His efforts
extended beyond the domain of advancing formal standards for
admission to study and practice; they went deeper-into the sub-
stance of law.
It is not necessary to detail here the specific contributions of
Professor Cook to law by reference to his many writings upon a
wide variety of legal subjects. In passing it may be observed that
his writings are not voluminous, for the fine quality and outstand-
ing character of his workmanship precluded this. A fair appraisal
of his larger accomplishments and contributions to legal scholar-
ship would include, among others, the following:
(1) His casebooks in equity and allied subjects brought to-
gether the relation between law and equity, historically and in
contemporary law. The evolution and growth of obliterating ten-
dencies in procedural systems was emphasized. Because the
cleavage between the two systems had not vanished entirely with
the years, the question of what relief could Ife afforded by our judi-
cial system upon a given set of facts had the decided merit of
realistic presentation. His analysis of the powers of courts of
equity in terms of the in rem and in personcm concepts has afforded
a jurisdictional basis for equitable relief through fictional adapta-
tions.
(2) In the field of conflict of laws, his basic conceptions of the
judicial process in all conflict cases as involving in final analysis
the application of the law of the forum were marked contributions
to the subject. These conceptions are so fundamental that they
form the basis for the cleavage between what might be called two
schools of thought in conflicts, one of which follows the late Pro-
fessor Beale; the other Professor Cook. The all-pervading extra-
territorial force of the applicable rule of "law," a conception of
the Bealian school, has unfortunately too fully permeated the re-
statement of the subject. Professor Cook also emphasized the
practical considerations that influence the choice of rules by courts
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